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UVODNIK

V novi finančni perspektivi, ki bo podlaga za pripravo letnih proračunov EU v obdobju 2014 - 2020, naj bi bilo za znanost in raziskave v okviru programa Obzorje (Horizon) 2020, ki bo sledil sedanjemu 7. Okvirnemu programu za znanost in raziskave (7.OP), po predlogu Evropske komisije na voljo okoli 80 milijard evrov. To je res občutno več kot 55 milijard evrov, kolikor ima na voljo 7.OP za obdobje 2007 – 2013. Zato ni čudno, da se različna mnenja in pogledi, kot po navadi ob pripravi takšnih dokumentov, ne krešejo samo na podlagi različnih ožjih interesov, temveč se postavljajo nekatera načelna vprašanja.

Eno takšnih, ki zadeva tudi Slovenijo kot eno od dvanajstih « novih » članic EU, je prav gotovo vprašanje prenizke zastopanosti te skupine članic v 7.OP, na kar je opozoril tudi Svet EU za konkurenčnost na svoji seji 9.marca letos, ki je med drugim pozval Evropsko komisijo, da preuči razloge te nizke zastopanosti nekaterih držav članic. Odločno podporo preučitvi te problematike je v svojem pismu evropski komisarki za raziskave, inovacije in znanost Maire Geoghegan-Quinn 1.aprila 2011 izrazil takratni slovenski minister za visoko šolstvo, znanost in tehnologijo Gregor Golobič, ki je argumentirano opozoril, da je skupina « novih » članic (EU12) dejansko premalo prisotna v projektih Okvirnega programa ter da bi bilo zato potrebno odpraviti ovire, ki preprečujejo optimalni izkoristek potenciala znanstvene odličnosti v tem delu Evrope. V pismu je posebej poudarjeno, da se EU12 težko vključijo v vodilne mednarodne mreže in konzorcije na področju raziskav in še težje pridobijo vlogo koordinatorjev projektov, kar nedvomno zavira oblikovanje Evropskega raziskovalnega prostora (ERA).

Odgovor komisarke Quinnove z dne 20.maja 2011 se je osredotočil na povzetek tistih instrumentov, ki lahko prispevajo k hitrejšemu oblikovanju ustrežnejših raziskovalnih zmogljivosti, ki bi omogočile večjo izrabo raziskovalnega potenciala v razširjeni EU (strukturni skladi, posebni program « Capacities » v 7.OP) kot tudi na možnosti finančnih shem v okviru kohezijske politike, 7.Okvirnega programa, vključno s Programom za konkurenčnost in inovacije (CIP). Med predlaganimi ukrepi za izboljšanje udeležbe EU12 v programih znanosti in raziskav je Komisarka Quinnova omenila še učinkovitejše delovanje NCP-jev ter potrebo njihovega mrežnega povezovanja na evropski ravni, večjo vključitev ocenjevalcev iz držav EU12 ter boljše povezovanje znanstvenikov med EU12 in EU15 v okviru programa COST. K manjšemu razkoraku v znanstveno-raziskovalni razvitosti držav in regij v EU naj bi prispevala tudi evropska podpora razvoju strategijam tim. « pametne » specializacije.

Skupni strateški okvir za financiranje raziskav in inovacij, ki naj bi z novim imenom (Obzorje 2020 namesto Okvirni program) **nakazal nekaj novega**, bo v obliki uradnega zakonodajnega predloga Evropske komisije zagledal luč sveta predvidoma že v novembru, vsekakor pa še letos. Ne glede na končno obliko sprememb, ki bodo po obravnavi v Svetu EU za konkurenčnost in v Evropskem parlamentu ter po zaključku celotnega postopka njegovega sprejemanja formalno uveljavljene, naj bi vendar pomenil prelomnico na področju subvencioniranja raziskav in inovacij iz evropskih sredstev, s tem pa prinesel večjo tim. « evropsko dodano vrednost », tako znanstveno-raziskovalni sferi, kot vzdolž celotne inovacijske « verige ». Poleg **tesnejšega povezovanja inovacijske in raziskovalne dejavnosti** naj bi bila njegova pomembna sestavina **poenostavitev**, saj naj bi s **preglednejšo strukturo, manj instrumenti in preprečevanjem njihovega podvajanja postal dostopnejši, zlasti za mala in srednja podjetja**. Še vedno bodo pozornost v interesu vseh v EU zaslužili **veliki projekti**, ki naj bi z raziskavami na evropski ravni v soočanju z « velikimi izzivi » v Evropi (zlasti na področjih energije, prehrane, podnebnih sprememb in staranja prebivalstva) povezali odlične znanstvene in poslovne potencialne na poti k vrhunskim odkritjem ter pretvorbi le-teh v globalno konkurenčne evropske izdelke in storitve. Tu naj bi naša znanstveno-raziskovalna sfera, **kjer dosega odlične rezultate v mednarodnem merilu**, vsekakor **morala biti uspešna**. Poleg teh, ki bodo seveda morali **dosegati kritično maso** za uresničevanje sprejetih ciljev, pa naj bi svoje mesto, tudi v okviru reševanja problemov « velikih izzivov », našli manjši inovacijski projekti, kjer se Slovenija prav tako lahko vključuje, tako z vidika prijavljanja posameznih projektov kot, na državni ravni, z zavzemanjem za malim in srednjim podjetjem prijaznejšo inovacijsko politiko EU. Še posebej zato, ker se bo Obzorje (Horizon) 2020 oslanjalo na pobudo Unija inovacij iz Strategije EU2020, zato prizadevanje za močnejše vključevanje predvsem tistih MSP s potencialom hitre rasti ne bi smelo biti vprašljivo.

Ob tem, seveda, da na inoviranje ne gledamo samo z vidika nove tehnologije, temveč tudi razvoja sistemov ter miselnosti in delovanja. Bomo vsaj v tem uspeli ostati med prvimi v svetu in gospodarsko okrevanje spremenili v preporod gospodarstva? O tem, kako intelektualni potencial Evrope lahko pomeni njeno pomembno notranjo moč v globalni tekmi, pa bo odločno politično sporočilo Evropi in svetu prišlo predvidoma aprila prihodnje leto z mednarodne konference v Ljubljani na IJS, ki jo SGRZ skupaj z IJS in Srednjeevropsko pobudo že pospešeno pripravlja.

Če smo za uvrstitev „naših tem“ storili premalo ob sprejemanju programov OP6 in OP7, se nam to ne sme zgoditi ob Obzorju 2020. MVZT je v ta namen že organiziralo posebno delovno skupino, v kateri sodelujejo vsi nacionalni tematski koordinatorji, njim pa moramo vsi zainteresirani dostaviti svoje predloge in pobude. Če tega ne bomo storili v najkrajšem času, se ne smemo pritoževati, če v razpisih v naslednjih sedmih letih ne bomo našli „naših tem“. To bo toliko težje, ker bo očitno velik podarek na odličnosti, projekti bodo večji, možnosti za pridobitev koordinacijske vloge pa temu primerno zahtevnejša.

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1. AKTUALNE NOVICE

■ **Evropska komisija je predstavila predlog politike regionalnega razvoja za obdobje od leta 2014 do 2020**

Evropska komisija v predlogu politike regionalnega razvoja za obdobje med letoma 2014 in 2020 za Slovenijo predlaga izjemo. Slovenija bo po novem razdeljena na dve regiji, na bolj razvito Zahodno Slovenijo in manj razvito Vzhodno Slovenijo. Zahodna Slovenija presega 100 odstotkov povprečnega BDP v EU, zato bi teh pravilih morala biti uvrščena med bolj razvite evropske regije in bi ji pripadalo bistveno manj denarja. A ker je takšnih regij zelo malo, se je Evropska komisija odločila predlagati izjemo in jih vključiti med prehodne (tranzicijske) regije, ki dosegajo med 75 in 90 odstotkov povprečnega BDP v EU. To pomeni, da bo Zahodna Slovenija v obdobju od leta 2014 do 2020 dobila dve tretjini denarja, ki ga ima zdaj na voljo, če bodo države članice v okviru Sveta EU in Evropski parlament predlog Komisije potrdili. Vzhodna Slovenija pa sodi med manj razvite regije, to so tiste, ki dosegajo do 75 odstotkov povprečnega BDP v EU. Koliko denarja bodo posamezne države članice imele po letu 2013 na voljo za regionalni razvoj še ni mogoče reči. To bo znano šele, ko bodo sprejeti predpisi, ki jih je predložila Evropska komisija. To pa so krovna uredba, ki določa splošna pravila za Evropski sklad za regionalni razvoj (ESRR), Evropski socialni sklad (ESS), Kohezijski sklad, Evropski kmetijski sklad za razvoj podeželja (EKSRP) ter Evropski sklad za pomorstvo in ribištvo; tri posebne uredbe za ESRR, ESS in Kohezijski sklad; dve uredbi, ki obravnavata cilj evropskega teritorialnega sodelovanja in evropsko združenje za teritorialno sodelovanje (EZTS) in dve uredbi o Evropskem skladu za prilagoditev globalizaciji ter programu za socialne spremembe in inovacije. Prihodnost evropske regionalne politike je bila ena glavnih tem letošnjih Odprtih dnevov Regij in mest med 10. in 13. oktobrom v Bruslju. Poslanci Evropskega parlamenta na podlagi izkušenj Poljske in Estonije ugotavljajo, da je treba na nacionalni poenostaviti postopke, da bodo revnejše regije lahko bolj učinkovito črpale denar iz evropskih skladov. Poslanci ugotavljajo, da imajo nekatere članice velike težave pri črpanju denarja iz evropskih skladov za regionalni razvoj.

Več:
[Vprašanja in odgovori](#)

in
[Spletna stran s svežnjem zakonskih predlogov](#)
in
[Spletna stran Odprti dnevi regij in mest](#)
in
[Resolucija Evropskega parlamenta](#)

■ **Kažipot za Evropo gospodarno z viri**

Evropska komisija je predstavila načrt, na podlagi katerega naj bi do leta 2050 evropsko gospodarstvo postalo trajnostno. Načrt za Evropo, ki bo gospodarna z viri, predstavlja načine, kako lahko dosežemo z viri gospodarno rast. V načrtu so opredeljeni gospodarski sektorji, ki potrošijo največ virov, poleg tega so v njem navedena orodja in kazalniki za izvedbo ukrepov. Opredeljeni so ukrepi za preoblikovanje proizvodnje in potrošnje, s pobudami za investitorje, za promoviranje okolju prijaznih inovacij, za okolju bolj prijazno oblikovanje izdelkov, ekološko označevanje. Vlade Evropska komisija poziva, naj namesto dela obdavčijo onesnaževanje in uporabo virov, z ukrepi za potrošnike pa naj zagotovijo, da se bodo odločali za izdelke, ki so gospodarni z viri. Načrt prav tako vsebuje priporočila zsa oblikovanje cen, ki bodo odražale dejanske stroške uporabe virov, zlasti na področju varovanja okolja in zdravstva. Namen načrta je odpraviti negospodarnost z viri v sektorjih, ki so najbolj odgovorni za vplive na okolje, to so zlasti živilski sektor, gradnja in transport, ki povzročijo skupaj 70 do 80 odstotkov vseh vplivov na okolje. Leta 2013 bo Evropska komisija predstavila zakonske predloge za izvedbo tega kažipota.

Več o tem:
[Spletna stran o gospodarni rabi virov](#)
in
[Kažipot](#)
in
[Vprašanja in odgovori](#)

■ **Predlog za nova pravila za storitve splošnega gospodarskega interesa**

Evropska komisija je objavila predloge novih pravil za storitve splošnega gospodarskega interesa. Preden jih bo dokončno potrdila, jih je poslala v obravnavo državam članicam in zainteresiranim organizacijam. Nova pravila namerava dokončno potrditi konec januarja 2012.

Več:
[Spletna stran z novimi predlogi](#)

■ Predlogi Evropske komisije za spremembe pravnega reda za schengensko območje

Evropska komisija je predložila dva zakonodajna predloga, s katerima želi okrepiti upravljanje schengenskega območja in vzpostaviti mehanizem odločanja na ravni EU, kar pomeni, da o uvedbi začasnih kontrol na notranjih mejah ne bi več odločala vsaka država članica sama zase, ampak bi bila odločitev na podlagi predloga Evropske komisije sprejeta na ravni EU. Oba predloga je Evropska komisija že poslala v sprejem in odločanje v Svet EU, ki med evropskimi institucijami predstavlja države članice, in v Evropski parlament.

Več:

[Predlog za okrepitev upravljanja schengenskega območja](#)

in

[Predlog za vzpostavitev mehanizma odločanja na ravni EU](#)

in

[Spletna stran s predlogi o spremembah schengenskega sistema](#)

■ Vmesna gospodarska napoved Evropske komisije

Čerpav se gospodarska rast ustavlja, recesije v EU in evroobmočju ne bo, je v vmesni gospodarski napovedi ocenila Evropska komisija. Ta napoved temelji na podatkih za sedem največjih gospodarstev (Nemčija, Francija, Italija, Španija, Nizozemska, Velika Britanija in Poljska), Evropska komisija v njej ocenjuje, da bo letošnja gospodarska rast v evroobmočju 1,6-odstotna, kar je enako, kot je ocenila maja v spomladanski napovedi, za EU pa je oceno znižala za 0,1 odstotne točke na 1,7 odstotka. Analitiki na komisiji napovedujejo, da bo letos inflacija v evroobmočju 2,5 odstotka, v EU pa 2,9 odstotka. V obeh primerih je Komisija napoved v primerjavi z majem znižala za 0,1 odstotne točke.

Več o tem:

[Vmesna gospodarska napoved](#)

■ Predlog strategije za reformo visokošolskega izobraževanja v EU

Evropska komisija je predstavila strategijo za reformo visokošolskega izobraževanja, s katero želi doseči povečanje števila diplomantov, kakovostnejše poučevanje in kar

največji prispevek visokega šolstva k okrevanju gospodarstva Evropske unije po krizi. Strategija opredeljuje prednostna področja, na katerih si morajo države EU bolj prizadevati za doseg skupnih izobraževalnih ciljev, in načine, na katere lahko Evropska unija podpre njihove politike. Pobude na ravni EU bodo vključevale večdimenzionalno razvrščanje univerz za boljšo obveščenost študentov pri izbiranju primernega študija ter garancijsko shemo za študentska posojila za opravljanje celotnega študija v tujini, kot je Erasmus za magistrski študij.

Več o tem:

[Strategija](#)

in

[Delovni dokument Komisije o najnovšem razvoju evropskih visokošolskih sistemov](#)

in

[Spletna stran o visokošolskem izobraževanju](#)

2. KRATKE NOVICE

■ Kljub varčevalnim ukrepom se zadolženost držav v EU še povečuje

Evropska komisija je objavila poročilo o stanju javnih financ. V njem navaja, da se bo brez dodatnih varčevalnih ukrepov javni dolg v EU od 59 odstotkov BDP v letu 2007 do leta 2012 povečal na 83,3 odstotka BDP, v evroobmočju pa s 66,3 na 88,7 odstotka BDP, pa tudi do leta 2014 se ne bo bistveno zmanjšal, saj bo v evroobmočju zmanjšal na 85,1 odstotka BDP, v celotni EU pa na 79,9 odstotka. Dovoljena meja v skladu z določbami pakta stabilnosti in rasti je 60 odstotkov BDP. Vse države, razen Finske, Latvije in Luksemburga, ocenjujejo, da bodo do leta 2014 dosegle najvišjo stopnjo zadolženosti, potem pa bo njihov dolg začel padati. Države, kot so Grčija, Irska, Portugalska, Velika Britanija in Španija, bodo do leta 2014 za malo zmanjšale svojo zadolženost, zniževanje javnega dolga pod dovoljeno mejo pa bo tam trajalo še leta. Slovenijo Evropska komisija uvršča med države članice, v katerih javni dolg najhitreje narašča, ni pa še presegel meje 60 odstotkov BDP.

Več:

[Sporočilo Evropske komisije](#)

[Spletna stran s poročilom](#)

■ Poslovne šole imajo ključno vlogo pri povečevanju deleža žensk na vodilnih položajih

Čeprav je med diplomanti univerz v EU približno 60 odstotkov žensk, je med člani uprav vodilnih evropskih podjetij le 12 odstotkov žensk, predsednic uprav pa je le 3 odstotke. Poslovne šole imajo odločilno vlogo pri pripravi mladih žensk na poslovno kariero, ženskam pomagajo pri pripravi poklicne kariere s seminarji, izobraževalnimi programi in možnostmi povezovanja v mreže. Poslovne šole prispevajo k oblikovanju načina razmišljanja prihodnjih voditeljev, ugotavljajo na Evropski komisiji. Evropski parlament pa v svoji resoluciji meni, da je treba ženskam, ki ustanovijo in vodijo majhno ali srednje veliko podjetje, zagotoviti boljše finančno podporo in tudi možnosti za izobraževanje.

Več o tem:

[Spletna stran o enaki zastopanosti žensk na vodilnih položajih](#)

in

[Resolucija Evropskega parlamenta](#)

Poročilo o uporabi prava EU in poročilo o prenosu evropskih direktiv v pravni red držav članic

Evropska komisija je objavila poročilo o uporabi prava EU in poročilo o prenosu direktiv EU v pravni red držav članic. V poročilu o uporabi prava EU ugotavlja, da se je zmanjšalo število kršitev, zaradi katerih Evropska komisija proti državam članicam uvede postopek. V poročilu o prenosu direktiv v pravni red držav članic pa navaja, da Slovenija v svoj pravni red ni prenesla 25 direktiv, kar je 1,6-odstotni zaostanek pri prenosu zakonodaje, kar je precej več od meje 1 odstotka, kar je priporočilo Evropske komisije. Evropska komisija ima sicer proti Sloveniji na področju notranjega trga odprtih 17 postopkov, kar jo uvršča med pet držav z najmanj odprtimi postopki.

Več:

[Poročilo o uporabi prava EU](#)

in

[Poročilo o prenosu direktiv v nacionalni pravni red](#)

Evropska komisija je objavila letno poročilo o boju proti goljufijam

Evropska komisija je objavila letno poročilo o zaščiti finančnih interesov EU, v katerem poroča o nepravilnostih in domnevnih goljufijah, ki so jih ugotovile države članice, ter o vračilu sredstev EU. Število sporočenih nepravilnosti se je v primerjavi z letom 2009 povečalo, in sicer s 7.769 na 10.332 primerov.

Največje število nepravilnosti so odkrili na področju kohezijske politike.

Več:

[Spletna stran, na kateri je objavljeno poročilo](#)

Strategija za oblikovanje kazensko-pravne politike EU

Evropska komisija je v sporočilu o politiki z naslovom Oblikovanje kazensko-pravne politike EU opredelila strategijo in načela, ki jih bo uporabljala v kazenskem pravu EU za izboljšanje izvrševanja evropskih politik in zaščito interesov državljanov. V sporočilu določa pogoje, pod katerimi lahko Unija in njene države članice sodelujejo pri vzpostavljanju skladne in dosledne kazensko-pravne politike EU.

Več:

[Sporočilo Evropske komisije](#)

in

[Spletna stran o uporabi kazenskega prava](#)

Izobraževanje o evropskem pravu

Evropska komisija je prepričana, da je potrebno povečati število sodnikov, tožilcev, odvetnikov in drugih pravnikov, izobraženih o evropskem pravu. Zato namerava zagotoviti, da bi se polovica vseh pravnikov v Evropski uniji (približno 700 000) do leta 2020 udeležila neke vrste evropskega izobraževanja v pravosodju. Cilj je usposobiti pravnike za uporabo evropskega prava – kar je del njihove sodniške ali odvetniške vloge na nacionalni ravni. Nacionalne vlade, sodne svete, poklicne organe in ustanove za izobraževanje v pravosodju na ravni EU in na nacionalni ravni Komisija poziva, naj se zavežejo k vključevanju prava EU v svoje programe izobraževanj ter k povečanju števila tečajev in udeležencev. Obljublja tudi, da bo zagotovila lažji dostop do sredstev EU, namenjenih podpori visokokakovostnih projektov izobraževanja, vključno z e-učenjem. V predlogu novega večletnega finančnega okvira EU je Komisija predlagala, da bi evropsko izobraževanje v pravosodju postalo pomembna prednostna naloga, katere cilj bi bilo do leta 2020 usposobiti več kot 20 000 pravnikov letno.

Več:

[Spletna stran o izobraževanju v pravosodju](#)

in

[Evropski portal e-pravosodje](#)

Evropska komisija je objavila poročilo o davčnih reformah v članicah EU

Evropska komisija v poročilu o davčnih reformah v članicah EU ugotavlja, da imajo izvedene davčne reforme pomemben vpliv na prihodke držav članic. Med izzivi, ki na davčnem področju čakajo države članice, pa omenja, da bi morale davčni sistem spremeniti tako, da bi bil prijazen za spodbujanje gospodarske rasti.

Več:

[Poročilo](#)

3. NOVA ZAKONODAJA

Sprejet je sveženj predpisov o gospodarskem upravljanju

Svet EU in Evropski parlament sta sprejela sveženj predpisov o gospodarskem upravljanju. V njem so uredba o okrepitvi nadzora nad proračunskim stanjem ter o nadzoru in usklajevanju gospodarskih politik, uredba o pospešitvi in razjasnitvi izvajanja postopka v zvezi s čezmernim primanjkljajem, uredba o preprečevanju in odpravljanju makroekonomskih neravnovesij, uredba o učinkovitem izvrševanju proračunskega nadzora v evroobmočju, uredba o izvršilnih ukrepih za odpravo čezmernih makroekonomskih neravnovesij v evroobmočju in direktiva o zahtevah v zvezi s proračunskimi okviri držav članic.

Več o tem:

[Spletna stran, kjer so objavljene sprejete uredbe in direktiva](#)

in

[Sporočilo Sveta Eu o sprejetju svežnja](#)

Sprejeta je direktiva o evrovinjeti

Cilj direktive je zmanjšati onesnaženost zaradi cestnega tovornega prometa in omogočiti bolj tekoč promet z zaračunavanjem cestnin, ki bi vključevale stroške onesnaževanja zraka in obremenitve s hrupom zaradi prometa (t. i. zunanji stroški), ter pripomoči k zmanjšanju obremenjenosti cest. V ta namen lahko države članice uporabijo »pristojbino za zunanje stroške« za tovornjake, ki bo dopolnila infrastrukturne pristojbine; prav tako lahko razlikujejo infrastrukturne pristojbine glede na obremenjenost cest.

Več:

[Besedilo direktive](#)

in

[Direktiva](#)

Sprejeta je uredba o označevanju živil

V skladu z novo uredbo bo morala obvezno biti na etiketi pakiranih živil navedena energetska vrednost, pa tudi vsebnost sladkorja, maščob in soli na 100 gramov oziroma 100 mililitrov. Proizvajalec, ki bo žele, bo lahko dodal tudi vrednosti za porcijo, prav tako bo dovoljeno dodati vrednost glede na priporočeno dnevno količino (Guidelines Daily Amounts). Večina novih zahtev bo morala biti uveljavljena tri leta po objavi uredbe v uradnem listu EU.

Več:

[Besedilo uredbe](#)

in

[Sporočilo o sprejetju uredbe](#)

Nova direktiva o varstvu potrošnikov

Svet EU je potrdil direktivo o varstvu potrošnikov, ki na ravni EU predpisuje, katere informacije morajo proedajalci dati potrošnikom, pravice za vrnitev kupljenega blaga, tudi prek spleta.

Več o tem:

[Besedilo direktive](#)

in

[Sporočilo o sprejemu direktive](#)

Sprejeta je nova uredba o celovitosti in preglednosti energetskega trga (REMIT)

Svet EU je sprejel uredbo o celovitosti in preglednosti energetskega trga (REMIT). Njen glavni namen je preprečiti zlorabo notranjih informacij in druge oblike tržnih zlorab, ki izkrivljajo veleprodajne cene energije, zaradi katerih ponavadi podjetja in potrošniki plačujejo za svojo energijo več, kot bi jim bilo treba. Nova uredba bo omogočila, da bo trgovanje z energijo prvič nadzorovano na ravni EU, s pa tudi odkrivanje zlorab.

Več:

[Besedilo uredbe](#)

in

[Sporočilo o sprejemu uredbe](#)

Sprejeta je nova direktiva o sredstvih za beljenje zob

Svet EU je sprejel novo direktivo o sredstvih za beljenje zob, ki jih je dovoljeno prodajati v EU. V njej so določena pravila za vsebnost vodikovega peroksida v skladu s priporočili Evropskega znanstvenega sveta za varstvo potrošnikov. Po novem bodo sredstva, ki vsebujejo do 0,1 odstotka vodikovega peroksida ostala v prosti prodaji, sredstva z vsebnostjo do 6 odstotkov pa bodo na voljo le zobozdravnikom.

Več:

[Sporočilo o sprejetju direktive](#)

RAPEX

Hitri sistem obveščanja EU o nevarnih proizvodih, ki krožijo na evropskem trgu. Posodobitve za septem-oktober:

http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/dyna/rapex/create_rapex.cfm?rx_id=402

http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/dyna/rapex/create_rapex.cfm?rx_id=401

http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/dyna/rapex/create_rapex.cfm?rx_id=400

http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/dyna/rapex/create_rapex.cfm?rx_id=399

4. GOSPODARSKE NOVICE

■ Gospodarsko okrevanje industrije se ustavlja

V drugem četrletju je bila industrijska proizvodnja v EU za 4,5 odstotka višja kot v enakem obdobju lani, a skoraj enaka kot v prvem četrletju. Na podlagi teh podatkov Evropska komisija v septembrskem poročilu o okrevanju v industriji v EU ugotavlja, da se gospodarsko okrevanje ustavlja.

Več:

[Poročilo Evropske komisije](#)

■ Anketa Eurobarometer o enotnem trgu EU

Državljeni EU so zadovoljni z enotnim trgom, ker jim omogoča večjo izbiro proizvodov (74 odstotkov), več delovnih mest (52 odstotkov) in pošteno konkurenco (47 odstotkov). Hkrati pa tudi ugotavljajo, da enotni trg prinaša ugodnosti le velikim podjetjem (62 odstotkov), slabša delovne pogoje (51 odstotkov), je pokazala anketa Eurobarometra o enotnem trgu.

Več:

[Rezultati ankete Eurobarometra](#)

in

[Rezultati o ovirah na enotnem trgu, na katere opozarjajo državljani](#)

in

[Spletna stran o anketi](#)

■ Javno posvetovanje o nadaljnjem zmanjšanju izpustov fluoriranih plinov

Do 19. decembra bo Evropska komisija prek javnega posvetovanja zbirala mnenja in stališča o nadaljnjem zmanjšanju izpustov fluoriranih plinov. Politične možnosti tega posvetovanja vključujejo nove prostovoljne dogovore, prepovedi za nove izdelke in opremo ter uvedbo načrta za postopno opuščanje dajanja fluoriranih ogljikovodikov (HFC) na trg EU. Poslanci Evropskega parlamenta pa v resoluciji zahtevajo, da je treba izpuste fluoriranih plinov zmanjšati.

Več:

[Spletna stran za sodelovanje v javnem posvetovanju](#)

in

[Spletna stran o fluoriranih plinih](#)

in

[Resolucija Evropskega parlamenta](#)

■ Okrepitev mreže Enterprise Europe v Aziji

Z odprtjem kontaktnih točk na Japonskem in podvojitvijo točk na Kitajskem je mreža Enterprise Europe, katere namen je pomagati srednjim in majhnim podjetjem, okrepila svojo prisotnost v Aziji. Evropska komisija kmalu načrtuje tudi njeno okrepitev v Severni Afriki, zlasti v Tuniziji, Egiptu in Maroku.

Več:

[Spletna stran Enterprise Europe Network](#)

■ Javni posvetovanja o dostopu do telefonskih in širokopasovnih omrežij

Evropska komisija je začela dve javni posvetovanja, prek katerih bo ugotavljala, kakšne so možnosti alternativnih operaterjev za dostop do fiksnih telefonskih in širokopasovnih omrežij, ki jih imajo v lasti oziroma jih upravljajo že uveljavljeni operaterji. Prvo posvetovanje se nanaša na

nediskriminatorni dostop alternativnih operaterjev do infrastrukture ter storitev prevladujočih telekomunikacijskih operaterjev, drugo pa je namenjeno obravnavi metode izračunavanja cen, ki jih morajo operaterji plačati za veleprodajni dostop (stroškovno naravnani ukrepi). Komisija bo rezultate uporabila pri pripravi priporočil za uporabo ukrepov proti diskriminaciji ter za nadzor cen. Javni posvetovanji sta odprti do 28. novembra.

Več:

[Posvetovanje o dostopu do infrastrukture](#)

in [Posvetovanje o metodi izračunavanja cen](#)

5. FINANČNE STORITVE

■ **Evropska komisija predlaga uvedbo davka na finančne transakcije**

Evropska komisija je predstavila predlog za uvedbo davka na finančne transakcije v 27 državah članicah Evropske unije. Obdavčene bi bile vse transakcije s finančnimi instrumenti med finančnimi institucijami, če ima vsaj ena od strank pri poslu sedež v EU. Trgovanje z delnicami in obveznicami bi bilo obdavčeno po stopnji 0,1 odstotka, trgovanje z izvedenimi finančnimi proizvodi pa po stopnji 0,01 odstotka. S tem bi vsako leto zbrali približno 57 milijard evrov. Komisija je predlagala uvedbo tega davka 1. januarja 2014. Prihodki iz davka bi se razdelili med EU in državami članicami. Del davka bi vplačali v proračun EU kot vir lastnih sredstev EU, ki bi delno zmanjšal prispevke držav članic. Evropska komisija je predlog že poslala v obravnavo in sprejem v Svet EU, ki med evropskimi institucijami predstavlja države članice, in v Evropski parlament. Uvedbo tega davka bo EU na vrhu G20 v Cannesu predlagala tudi na globalni ravni.

Več:

[Vprašanja in odgovori](#)

in

[Predlog direktive](#)

in

[Spletna stran s predlogom Komisije](#)

■ **Svet EU je dosegel dogovor o reguliranju trga z derivati**

Svet EU je dosegel dogovor o stališčih, ki jih bo zastopal pri pogajanjih z Evropskim parlamentom o predlogu uredbe, ki naj bi zagotovila več transparentnosti in manj rizika

pri trgovanju z derivati oziroma izvedenimi finančnimi instrumenti.

Več:

[Sporočilo o dogovoru Sveta EU](#)

6. REGIONALNA POLITIKA

■ **Smernice za sodelovanje občin in mest na področju javnih služb**

Evropska komisija je objavila smernice, kako občine, mesta, regije lahko sodelujejo pri izbiri podjetij za opravljanje javnih služb, kot je zbiranje odpadkov ali javni prevoz. Pod določenimi pogoji namreč takšno sodelovanje ne sodi v okvir evropskih predpisov za javno naročanje, kar pomeni, da je treba najjugodnejšega ponudnika izbrati prek javnega razpisa. Da bodo javni organi lažje ugotovili, za katere storitve je treba objaviti javni razpis in za katere ne, je Evropska komisija na podlagi sodbe Sodišča EU objavila smernice.

Več o tem:

[Smernice Evropske komisije](#)

in

[Spletna stran o sodelovanju med javnimi organi](#)

■ **Evropski poslanci podpirajo subvencije za turizem iz strukturnih skladov**

Poslanci Evropskega parlamenta menijo, da bi morali za rehabilitacijo turističnih krajev, ki so zastali v razvoju, uporabiti tudi subvencije iz evropskih strukturnih skladov. zavzeli so se tudi za oblikovanje evropske znamke za kakovost v turizmu.

Več:

[Besedilo, ki ga je sprejel Evropski parlament](#)

7. TRANSPORT IN ENERGETIKA

● **Začetek pogajanj o Kaspijskem plinovodu za transport plina v EU**

Evropska komisija je potrdila mandat za začetek pogajanj EU z Azerbajdžanom in Turkmenistanom o pogodbi za začetek gradnje Kaspijskega plinovoda za dobavo plina iz Kaspijskega bazena v EU.

Več o tem:

[Sporočilo Evropske komisije](#)

● Zaključki o transportnem sodelovanju s sosedomi EU

Svet EU je v zaključkih o sodelovanju med EU in sosednjimi državami na področju transporta izpostavil, da je treba pri tem sodelovanju upoštevati geografske posebnosti posameznih držav in to sodelovanje mora temeljiti na interesu držav za to.

Več o tem:

[Sporočilo o zaključkih](#)

8. EKOLOGIJA IN TRAJNOSTNI RAZVOJ

● Dva od treh Evropejcev menita, da so podnebne spremembe resen problem

Anketa Eurobarometra je pokazala, da so državljani EU zaradi podnebnih sprememb danes bolj zaskrbljeni, kot so bili leta 2009. Da so podnebne spremembe zelo resen problem, meni 68 odstotkov vprašanih (leta 2009 jih je imelo tako mnenje 64 odstotkov vprašanih). Na splošno veljajo podnebne spremembe za drugi najresnejši problem, s katerim se sooča svet, takoj za revščino, lakoto in pomanjkanjem pitne vode. Letos 51 odstotkov vprašanih podnebne spremembe označuje kot najresnejši ali enega od najresnejših problemov, leta 2009 je tako menilo 47 odstotkov vprašanih. V Sloveniji letos tako meni 67 odstotkov, kar jo uvršča na drugo mesto za Švedsko. Da je mogoče z bojem proti podnebnim spremembam in izboljšanjem energetske učinkovitosti spodbuditi gospodarstvo EU in ustvarjanje delovnih mest meni 78 odstotkov vprašanih, leta 2009 jih je tako menilo 63 odstotkov. V vseh državah članicah se s tem stališčem strinjata vsaj dva od treh vprašanih. Davčni politiki, ki bi v večji meri temeljila na rabi energije, je naklonjenih 68 odstotkov vprašanih. Boj proti podnebnim spremembam je po prepričanju vprašanih predvsem odgovornost nacionalnih vlad, EU in podjetij. Malo več kot polovica vprašanih (53 odstotkov) navaja, da so v zadnjih šestih mesecih tudi sami ravnali tako, da ne bi škodili podnebnju, 66 odstotkov jih trdi, da so zmanjšali količino odpadkov, pa da odpadke reciklirajo. V Sloveniji je 74 odstotkov vprašanih zagotovilo, da so v zadnjih šestih mesecih sami s svojim ravnanjem prispevali k zmanjšanju vplivov na podnebje. Da so zmanjšali količino odpadkov in jih reciklirajo, je odgovorilo 86 odstotkov Slovencev.

Več o tem

[Poročilo Eurobarometra](#)

● Evropska komisija podpira program za ugotavljanje stroškov uničevanja zemlje na globalni ravni

Evropska komisija je objavila pobudo za uvedbo programa za ugotavljanje uničevanja zemlje na svetovni ravni (Economics of Land Degradation initiative – ELD). Podpirata jo tudi nemška zvezna vlada in sekretariat OZN za preprečevanje širjenja puščav. Zdaj pričakujejo pristop drugih vlad, mednarodnih organizacij, podjetij, nevladnih organizacij.

Več:

[Spletna stran z brošuro o pobudi](#)

in

[Spletna stran zasedanja, na katerem so objavili pobudo](#)

9. VARSTVO POTROŠNIKOV

● Uvedeni so bili ukrepi zoper sporne spletne strani za prodajo vstopnic

Evropska komisija je sporočila, da so bili za sporne spletne strani, ki so prodajale vstopnice za neobstoječe prireditve ali niso pojasnile, ali je kupec upravičen do povračila stroškov v primeru odpovedi prireditve ali ne, uvedeni soti ukrepi. Od spletnih strani za prodajo vstopnic, za katere so preverili, ali spoštujejo predpise EU o varstvu potrošnikov, jih je zdaj z zakonodajo EU usklajenih 88 odstotkov. Septembra 2010 so nacionalne oblasti vseh držav članic, Norveške in Islandije uvedle pregled »Sweep«, ki ga koordinira EU. Ugotovljene so bile naslednje težave: nepopolne ali zavajajoče informacije o cenah vstopnic, nepoštena določila in pogoji ter nepopolne ali zavajajoče informacije o trgovcu. Nepravilnosti na spletnih straneh so bile v večini odpravljene prostovoljno, v nekaterih primerih pa so bile izrečene kazni.

Več o tem:

[Spletna stran o pregledih Sweep za prodajalce vstopnic](#)

in

[Vprašanja in odgovori o pregledih Sweep za prodajalce vstopnic](#)

in

[Splošna spletna stran EU Sweep](#)

10. RR IN INOVACIJE

● Javno posvetovanje o Evropskem raziskovalnem prostoru (ERA)

Evropska komisija želi prek javnega posvetovanja, ki je odprto do 30. novembra,

pridobiti mnenja in predloge od znanstvenikov in drugih zainteresiranih o Evropskem raziskovalnem prostoru (ERA), ki ga hoče vzpostaviti do leta 2014 in tako ustvariti enotni trg za znanje, raziskave in inovacije. To bo po oceni Komisije raziskovalcem, raziskovalnim ustanovam in podjetjem omogočilo mobilnost, konkuriranje in mednarodno sodelovanje po vsej Evropi. Na podlagi mnenj in predlogov, ki jih bo dobila, bo Evropska komisija do konca leta 2012 objavila predlog okvira za ERA.

Več:

[Spletna stran za sodelovanje pri posvetovanju](#)
in

[Dokument, ki je v javnem posvetovanju](#)

Petnajst let programa Marie Curie

Program EU za pomoč raziskovalcem Marie Curie je zabeležil 15. obletnico. V tem času je EU prek njega podprla 50 tisoč raziskovalcev. Po letu 2013 bo financiranje programa Marie Curie zagotovljeno prek novega programa za znanost in raziskave Horizon 2020, za katerega Evropska komisija v predlogu novega finančnega okvira predlaga 80 milijard evrov. To je občutno več kot 55 milijard evrov, kolikor ima na voljo za obdobje od leta 2007 do 2013 sedanji sedmi okvirni program za znanost in raziskave (FP7). V tem programu je za Marie Curie na voljo 4,7 milijarde evrov.

Več:

[Spletna stran Marie Curie](#)

Rešitve za izzive, s katerimi se spopada družba, je treba iskati s partnerstvi

Evropska komisija je povabila javne in zasebne organizacije, naj s partnerstvi s področja raziskav in inovacij na ravni EU skupaj iščejo rešitve za izzive, s katerimi se spopada družba. Komisija to predlaga na podlagi izkušenj pri pilotnih projektih in opredeljuje ukrepe, ki bodo pripomogli k številnejšim in učinkovitejšim javno-zasebnim in javno-javnim partnerstvom. Raziskave in inovacije omogočajo rešitve za pomembne družbene izzive (staranje prebivalstva, posledice podnebnih sprememb in manjšo razpoložljivost sredstev). Težave so pogosto prevelike, da bi jih lahko rešila ena sama država članica ali družba, zlasti zaradi sedanjega skrčenja proračunskih sredstev javnega sektorja, navaja Evropska komisija.

Več:

[Vprašanja in odgovori](#)

in

[Spletna stran o skupnem načrtovanju](#)

Novo metode, ki naj bi nadomestile testiranje na živalih za potrebe kozmetične industrije

Evropska komisija je objavila poročilo o napredku pri iskanju metod, ki naj bi nadomestile testiranje na živalih za potrebe kozmetične industrije. V njem ugotavlja, da kljub prizadevanjem in napredku na področju raziskav in inovacij nove metode še ne bodo na voljo pravočasno, to je leta 2013. A to ne pomeni, da bo Komisija predlagala podaljšanje roka. Svoje odločitve bo sporočila, ko bo imela na mizi popolno analizo razmer.

Več:

[Poročilo](#)

EU investira 30 milijonov evrov v raziskovalni projekt o povezavah med geni, okoljem in zdravjem

Za raziskovalni projekt BLUEPRINT, katerega proračun je 40 milijonov evrov, bo EU prispevala 30 milijonov evrov, je sporočila Evropska komisija. Projekt vključuje 41 vodilnih evropskih univerz, raziskovalnih inštitutov in podjetij. Njegov namen je poiskati povezave med geni, okoljem in zdravjem. Projekt izvaja konzorcij International Human Epigenome Consortium (IHEC).

Več:

[Spletna stran projekta BLUEPRINT](#)

in

[Spletna stran IHEC](#)

11. KULTURA IN IZOBRAŽEVANJE

Organizacija OECD je objavila poročilo o izobraževanju

Države morajo investirati v izobraževanje, saj je več kot 50 odstotkov mladih, ki so stari med 15 in 19 let in niso vključeni v izobraževanje, brez zaposlitve, v svojem poročilu o izobraževanju ugotavlja OECD. Leta 2009 je stopnja brezposelnih univerzitetno izobraženih ljudi v državah OECD bila 4,4 odstotka, stopnja brezposelnih ljudi, ki niso končali visokošolskega izobraževanja pa se je povečala 8,7 odstotka leta 2008 na 11,5 odstotka. Človek z visokošolsko izobrazbo po podatkih analitikov OECD lahko pričakuje več kot 50 odstotkov višjo plačo kot človek, ki ima srednješolsko izobrazbo. Države OECD za

študenta od osnovne šole do univerze v povprečju namenijo 9860 dolarjev.

Več:

[Poročilo OECD](#)

in

[Spletna stran s poročilom](#)

Evropska komisija je objavila poročilo o visokoškolskem izobraževanju

Članice EU morajo več mladim omogočiti dostop do visokošolskega izobraževanja, da bodo dosegle cilj iz strategije Evropa 2020, ki je, da mora imeti leta 2020 visokošolsko izobrazbo 40 odstotkov ljudi, starih med 30 in 34 let, Evropska komisija navaja v poročilu o visokoškolskem izobraževanju. Največje povečanje proračuna za izobraževanje za leto 2010/2011 glede na leto prej je opazila pri Litvi, Liechtensteinu, Avstriji, Franciji, Finski in Malti. Največje zmanjšanje je zabeležila za Grčijo, Irsko in Islandijo (za 8 do 10 odstotkov). Slovenija je med članicami s povečanjem med 0 in 5 odstotkov.

Več:

[Poročilo](#)

in

[Glavni poudarki](#)

in

[Spletna stran s študijami s področja izobraževanja](#)

Anketa Eurobarometra o poklicnem izobraževanju

Za poklicno izobraževanje in usposabljanje se po obveznem šolanju v EU odloči skoraj polovica mladih. Anketa Eurobarometra je pokazala, da le 27 odstotka mladih, ki so stari med 15 in 24 let, pravi, da bi ga priporočilo vrstnikom. Slovenija je med državami, kjer je največ vprašanih odgovorilo, da ima poklicno izobraževanje in usposabljanje v državi pozitivno podobo. Da poklicno izobraževanje in usposabljanje ponuja visoko kakovostno učenje, je v EU odgovorilo 75 odstotkov vprašanih, v Sloveniji pa 64 odstotkov. Da so učitelji in predavatelji kompetentni, v EU meni 76 odstotkov vprašanih, v Sloveniji pa 72 odstotkov, da poklicno izobraževanje in usposabljanje ljudem omogoča, da lahko nadaljujejo študij na univerzi, se v EU strinja 68 odstotkov vprašanih, v Sloveniji pa 65 odstotkov.

Več:

[Poročilo z rezultati ankete Eurobarometra](#)

in

[Odgovori v Sloveniji](#)

Izhodiščne plače učiteljev niso privlačne, piše v poročilu o plačah učiteljev

V skoraj vseh evropskih državah je bruto osnovna plača učiteljev na začetku poklicne poti nižja od nacionalnega BDP na prebivalca, njihova plača pa se v času njihove delovne dobe v večini držav ne podvoji. To sta glavni ugotovitvi poročila, ki primerja plače učiteljev in ravnateljev v javnem sektorju v 27 državah članicah EU, Islandiji, Lihtenštajnu, na Norveškem in v Turčiji. Podatki, ki temeljijo na šolskem letu 2009/10, zajemajo predšolsko do srednješkolsko izobraževanje. Glede na razpoložljive podatke ter ob upoštevanju plačnih razredov in dodatkov so najbolje plačani učitelji v Evropski uniji v Luksemburgu, na Danskem in v Avstriji. Najslabše plačani so v Bolgariji in Romuniji. V državah članicah je trenutno zaposlenih šest milijonov učiteljev. Slovenija je med državami, kjer so se plače učiteljem v šolskem letu 2009/2010 povečale na podlagi splošnega povečanja plač v javnem sektorju.

Več:

[Poročilo](#)

Idrija je med nagrajenci EDEN 2011 za zgledno oživitev in spodbujanje propadajočih območij

Enaindvajset destinacij iz vse Evrope, med njimi je Idrija, je prejelo nagrado EDEN 2011 za zgledno oživitev in spodbujanje propadajočih območij. Vse destinacije so imele pomembno vlogo pri oživljanju regije in vnašanju novega življenja v propadajoča kulturna, zgodovinska in naravna območja ter so pospeševale širšo lokalno obnovo, pojasnjuje Evropska komisija.

Več:

[Seznam nagrajencev](#)

in

[Spletna stran EDEN](#)

12. KMETIJSTVO

Anketa Eurobarometer o skupni kmetijski politiki

Pred predstavitvijo predloga za skupno kmetijsko politiko za obdobje med letoma 2014

in 2020 so anketarji Eurobarometra vprašali državljane, kaj menijo o predlogu, da bi neposredna plačila povezali z ukrepi za varovanje okolja, o plačilih za razvoj podeželja, podpori majhnih kmetij. V Sloveniji je nad povprečjem EU delež odgovorov na vprašanje, da bi bilo treba neposredna plačila kmetom povezati z ukrepi, ki jih izvedejo za varovanje okolja. Bistveno več vprašanih kot v EU v Sloveniji meni, da se bodo majhne kmetije lahko posodobile in postale bolj konkurenčne, če jim bo sistem plačil bolj ustrezal.

Več o tem:

[Rezultati ankete Eurobarometra](#)

in

[Odgovori v Sloveniji](#)

Nanoški sir je zaščiteni slovenski proizvod na ravni EU

Nanoški sir je šesto slovensko živilo, ki je zaščiteno na ravni EU. Evropska komisija je v Uradnem listu EU zanj objavila registracijo za zaščiteni označbo porekla. To pomeni, da morajo vse faze pridelave in predelave tega sira potekati na določenem geografskem območju, saj sta kakovost in značilnost proizvoda posledici vpliva določenega geografskega okolja.

Več:

[Spletna stran o zaščitenih oznakah EU](#)

Sledenje izvoru hrane od kmetije do krožnika z mobilnim telefonom

Odkritja z raziskavami, opravljenimi v okviru projektov, ki jih financira EU, lahko kmalu omogočijo, da bodo potrošniki lahko z mobilnim telefonom ugotavljali izvor hrane, ki jo imajo na krožniku, sporoča Evropska komisija. Zdaj je treba še prepričati industrijo in politike, da bodo s spremembami predpisov to omogočili.

Več o tem:

[Spletna stran o publikaciji, v kateri so objavljene predlagane rešitve](#)

in

[Spletna stran s prezentacijami na konferenci Kaj je za kosilo](#)

13. JUGOVZHODNA EVROPA IN SOSEDSKA POLITIKA

Napredek Moldavije in Ukrajine proti liberalizaciji vizumskega režima

Evropska komisija je objavila poročilo o napredku Moldavije in Ukrajine pri uresničevanju načrta za vizumsko liberalizacijo. Za Moldavijo ugotavlja, da jo še čaka delo za odpravo pomanjkljivosti na področju varovanja podatkov, boja proti organiziranemu kriminalu in korupciji. Ukrajina pa mora izpolniti zahtevane pogoje še na področju zaščite dokumentov, azilne politike, boja proti organiziranemu kriminalu in trgovini z ljudmi.

Več o tem:

[Sporočilo Evropske komisije](#)

Evropska komisija predlaga začetek pogajanj z Armenijo in Azerbajdžanom o vizumih

Evropska komisija v predlogu za začetek pogajanj o vizumih med EU in Armenijo in EU in Azerbajdžanom predlaga zmanjšanje količine dokumentov, ki jih morajo državljani Armenije in Azerbajdžana predložiti kot dokazilo za pridobitev vizuma, možnosti za izdajo vizumov za daljši čas in več vstopov v EU, znižanje cene za določene kategorije potnikov, možnost ukinitve vizumov za ljudi z diplomatskim potnim listom.

Več o tem:

[Sporočilo Evropske komisije o prelogu za začetek pogajanj z Armenijo](#)

in

[Sporočilo Evropske komisije o predlogu za začetek pogajanj z Azerbajdžanom](#)

14. NAJAVE DOGODKOV

✚ **The Empowerment of Local Authorities: Spatial Information and Spatial Planning Tools**

Paris, October 25 - 28, 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **3rd Symposium on Environmental Management - Towards Sustainable Technologies**

Zagreb, October 26 - 28, 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **IHT Global Clean Energy Forum**

Barcelona, October 26 - 27, 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **Place as Resource Conference**

Dublin, October 27 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **GMES User Forum**

Brussels, October 27, 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **Service Sector in Terms of Changing Environment**

Ohrid, October 27 - 29, 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **International Conference for Academic Disciplines**

Rome, October 30 – November 3, 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **Changes in Social and Business Environment CISABE'11**

Panevezys, November 03 - 04, 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **INTER-ENG 2011**

Tirgu Mures, November 03 - 05, 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **Life Cycle Assessment - a Tool for strategic decision-making**

Lille, November 03 - 04, 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **International Conference Environment Landscape European Identity**

Bucharest, November 04 - 06, 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **UEL International Development Undergraduate Conference**

London, November 05, 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **Conference: Modernisation of the Professional Qualifications Directive**

Brussels, November 07, 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **Green Electronics 2011**

Bucharest, November 08 - 10, 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **The Challenge of Air Quality: A Regional Perspective**

Brussels, November 10, 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **Payments for Ecosystem Services and their Institutional Dimensions**

Berlin, November 10 - 12, 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **Agrosym Jahorina 2011**

Jahorina, November 11, 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **Shorelines: A one day international symposium exploring place, creativity and wellbeing**

Scotland, November 15, 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **Business and Sustainable Development**

Sarajevo, November 16 - 17, 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **Innovation, Philosophy, Scientific Realism and Methodology in Green Economics**

Oxford, November 18 – 19, 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **Conservation and management of forests for sustainable development: where science meets policy**

Leuven, November 23 – 24, 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **3rd High-Level Conference on Industrial Competitiveness: "Delivering an Integrated Industrial Policy for the Globalisation Era"**

Brussels, November 24, 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **ICT Standards and Patents – the public authority and international perspective**

Brussels, November 24, 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **Conference on Market Surveillance and Machinery**

Brussels, November 24, 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **European Conference for Academic Disciplines**

Gottenheim near Freiburg, November 27 – December 2 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **Good Practices in Gender Mainstreaming: Towards Effective Gender Training**

Brussels, November 28, 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **2011 Annual Polis Conference and Polis Annual General Assembly**

Brussels, November 29 - 30, 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **Final EURASIAPAC Workshop**

Brussels, November 30, 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

✚ **Workshop on Competitiveness, Innovation and REACH**

Brussels, December 06, 2011
Več informacij [tukaj](#)

15. ZANIMIVE PUBLIKACIJE

✚ [Conference debate with Viviane Reding](#)

✚ [Baltic Sea, Danube and MacroRegional Strategies: A Model for Transnational Cooperation in the EU?](#)

✚ [Green, safe, cheap: Where next for EU energy policy?](#)

✚ [Innovation: How Europe can take off](#)

✚ [Britain, Ireland and Schengen: Time for a smarter bargain on visas](#)

✚ [A Liquid Europe?](#)

✚ [The 'Next Generation' Visa: Belt and braces or the emperor's new clothes?](#)

✚ [Debt Reduction without Default](#)

✚ [The European Court of Justice: Empowered after Lisbon](#)

✚ [Business Models in European Banking: A pre-and post-crisis screening](#)

✚ [Stability Council: Financial inspector of Germany's Länder](#)

✚ [Mitigating climate change through agriculture](#)

- ✚ [Commodity boom: More than just risk for German industry](#)
- ✚ [Enterprise & industry](#)
- ✚ [Labour mobility in the euro area](#)
- ✚ [The European Economic and Social Committee during the polish presidency](#)
- ✚ [Science, technology and innovation in Europe](#)
- ✚ [Europe's environment: An assessment of assessments](#)
- ✚ [Prevention and control of infectious diseases among people who inject drugs](#)
- ✚ [Finance for Europe's entrepreneurs](#)
- ✚ [Immigration: Integration and fundamental rights](#)

16. PRILOGA 1

Will the financial transaction tax (FTT) enhance stability?

CEPS / Brussels

In all likelihood, the European Commission's proposed tax on financial services, the financial transaction tax (FTT), will raise sizeable tax revenues, which explains its political appeal in the current context. However, the tax fails to address the key factors that contributed to the global financial crisis. Short of global or even EU-wide cooperation, many of the transactions subject to a tax will relocate to non-cooperating countries, thereby reducing revenue prospects and the effectiveness of supervision. Moreover, the proposal fails to address the growth of leverage, systemic risks, or the moral hazard risks arising from 'too-big-to-fail' or 'too-systemic-to-fail' institutions. Even if it becomes a reality, the proposal should not undermine the chances of more meaningful tax policy alternatives being implemented in the future.

After many months of waiting, the European Commission has finally revealed its preferred method for taxing the financial services industry. To the surprise of many, the measure comes in the form of a financial transaction tax (FTT). The published text proposes a tax of 0.1% on security trades and a 0.01% tax on all derivatives transactions, potentially bringing in substantial revenues.¹ The impact assessment accompanying the proposal suggests that it will lead to a massive relocation and 'disappearance' of activities and substantial hikes in the cost of capital, resulting in a reduction of long-run economic growth in the EU by an estimated 1.8%.

Traditionally, the key aim of a financial transaction tax is to discourage speculative trading. James Tobin, the godfather of the measure, promoted the tax as a way to "throw sand in the wheels of international finance", aiming to impose transaction costs for short-term currency trading to prevent excessive volatility and speculative attacks on currency (Eichengreen et al., 1995). In the present context of a looming sovereign debt tragedy, the tax has also become popular due to its revenue potential. According to the Commission's own arithmetic, the proposed FTT can raise anything between €25 billion to €45 billion per year. Whether it will achieve these aims is highly dependent on the plausibility of the Commission's underlying assumptions on avoidance and relocations. The probability of it being the best fiscal response among the existing potential policy options is even more questionable.

As recently as this spring, the FTT did not appear to be the number one choice among the list of tax policy alternatives at hand. Instead, the focus appeared to be more on the financial activity tax (FAT), which would tax 'supra-normal' profits and remuneration. The application of the third alternative, the financial stability contribution (FSC) and its variants, which would tax un-insured liabilities (excluding equity), has been left to the member states. The Commission's initial preference for the FAT over the FTT was mostly in line with the guidance provided by the IMF's reports on taxing financial services, published in 2010.

Having considered the three tax alternatives, the reports argued that the FTT would fail to address the "core sources of financial instability", would be easily avoidable, and passed on to final consumers. The reports also provided evidence from Swedish and UK experience that suggests that transaction taxes tend to lower market liquidity – and not always the bad kind – and increase short-term volatility. So, why did the Commission shift its focus suddenly? The reason appears to be political. Over the past few years, the measure has gained support in some member states, such as France and Germany, while being vehemently opposed by others, such as the UK. The Commission was given a green light to prepare an assessment by the European Parliament this March. Moreover, the concept of a transaction tax is simple and reflects a sense of equity, given that most household transactions are subject to a tax while financial transactions tend to be untaxed. To cap it all, as highlighted by Mr. Barroso, there is a sense that the moment is ripe for the "financial sector to make a contribution back to society". In short, given the resistance to any form of taxation from the industry, the Commission appears to have opted for instant political support.

Instead of relying solely on political or revenue-raising reasoning, the discussion should focus on the impact of taxes on financial stability – some of which are already highlighted in the Commission's impact assessment. Whichever alternative is chosen, it should not weaken financial stability and ensure that taxpayers would "never again be asked to foot the bill" for the banks' mistakes. In this regard, three lessons learnt from the crisis appear to be applicable.

First, the crisis highlighted the risks of 'too-big-to-fail' or 'too-systemic-to-fail' institutions. Such institutions benefit from an indirect guarantee of a bail-out, which gives their shareholders an incentive to direct managers to take on more risk. To a large extent, this particular form of moral hazard emanates from the facts that i) the public authorities have the ability (i.e. fiscal space) and the motive (i.e. domestic interest) to engage in a bail-out; and ii) there is no credible resolution mechanism to prevent messy bankruptcy procedures. As far as possible, the proposed policy should contribute to a solution and not aggravate systemic risks.

Second, the crisis has confirmed the belief that tougher regulations do not automatically enhance stability when regulatory arbitrage is an option. Relocation to less regulated jurisdictions or the 'disappearance' of certain transactions through repackaging may simply sweep problems under the carpet. It should not be forgotten that having the risks of global banks stored in off-balance sheet vehicles in offshore jurisdictions – tidily tucked away from the home state regulators' reach – did not prevent the financial crisis from propagating globally. In short, whatever form of tax instrument is introduced, it should be relatively hard to avoid.

Third, there are incentives for financial institutions – especially investment banks – to become over-leveraged, especially through the use of debt with short maturities. These activities introduce systemic externalities through increased inter-connectivity, as well as counterparty and propagation risks. Indeed, as the history of financial crises has amply demonstrated, speculation only becomes a problem when it is carried out with borrowed money, resulting in layers of promises that eventually become untenable. Many reasons have been put forward to explain the increased use of debt by financial institutions in recent years, including lax monetary policies, limited growth potential of traditional forms of funding, and incentives to match the volatility in asset valuations using short-term debt. Wherever possible, financial services taxes should correct – and certainly not worsen – the incentives to take on more leverage.

How does the FTT fare on these three fronts? Not so well. Insofar as it can be used to contribute to a credible resolution mechanism, any tax can be used to tackle the moral hazard risks from big and systemic banks. However, the FTT will probably only be used as a revenue-raising tool, with no specific aims to strengthen financial stability or secure credible resolution mechanisms. The tax could also play some role in mitigating systemic risks by targeting derivatives transactions, which give rise to such interdependencies. Despite this indirect impact, the FTT misses out completely on addressing

the growth of leverage or amending the tax preferences for debt, which are embedded in most tax systems across the EU.

A globally uncoordinated FTT is also likely to aggravate tax avoidance and relocations. As many observers have noted, trading operations are highly mobile, especially for the larger institutions. For those institutions, the list of 'safe harbours' will be long, given the fact that many G-20 countries, including the US and Canada – not to mention some EU member states, such as the UK – reject the idea of adopting an FTT. In driving a substantial proportion of the transactions away, the tax is also likely to hamper the monitoring and enforcement capacities of the home state supervisors.

In contrast, the other options originally on the table appear to be more appropriate responses to these challenges. On avoidance grounds, although the FAT liabilities can be mitigated by the existing profit-shifting arrangements, anti-transfer-pricing rules that are in place in many OECD members reduce the prevalence of such artificial transfers. The FAT could correct the incentives for increased risk-taking by limiting excessive earnings. In this way, the tax could serve as a substitute for the value-added tax (VAT), which is not applicable to financial services due to inherent difficulties in charging taxes to margin-based intermediation services.

In many respects, a Financial Stability Contribution would make a more fundamental contribution, effectively putting a price on systemic externalities arising from reliance on short-term funding, which constitutes the most volatile portion of banks' balance sheets. Taxes on uninsured liabilities are much harder to avoid provided that the tax basis is sufficiently broad, i.e. covering any activity that will arise from the use of offshore entities to offload taxable debt. The tax could also go a long way towards addressing one of the age-old problems in finance; namely the tax disincentive for raising capital since interest payments are tax-deductible while dividend payments are subject to taxation. Lastly, the FSC systems that are in place (or being considered) in many countries are often designed to contribute to the maintenance of credible resolution schemes, thereby addressing one of the key sources of moral hazard risk.

To sum up, although the FTT may have received political support, it is unlikely to materialise as an EU-wide measure. The proposal will at best be implemented in a subset of member states (under the so-called 'enhanced cooperation' rules). This will throw the proposal's ultimate impact further into question, ensuring more flexibility in relocating and avoidance and diminishing the revenue expectations. The Commission's aim may be to implement what is politically feasible now; however, the FTT fails to address the inherent weaknesses in the global financial system and should not undermine the chances of other tax options in the future.

17. PRILOGA 2

How to stop fragmentation of the Eurozone

Bruegel / Brussels

The continual rebounding of the Greek crisis is concealing a worrying development visible in the Eurozone since the summer: the beginnings of a process of fragmentation are increasingly noticeable. The first sign is that banks are once again reluctant to lend to each other. Since July the spread between the rate at which they borrow from each other and the zero risk rate has been climbing. Financial institutions with liquidity increasingly prefer to deposit their cash with the ECB, which has had to reactivate its direct lending procedures to banks. This is the same situation – though at this stage less acute – than in the 2007-08 crisis. The tension is obvious, and this time it is internal in origin. In London and New York the interbank market is still working.

The second sign is that one and the same cross-border bank is charging higher interest rates for firms in southern Europe than to similar firms in northern Europe. This cuts to the core of the single market, and it is making the situation for crisis-hit economies worse. Instead of combating this trend, northern European bank supervisors are magnifying it by setting limits to the exposure of their banks to southern Europe.

The third sign is that, in the eyes of international investors, southern European government bonds no longer belong to the same asset class as northern European ones. It is not simply a case of the price

of risk, by definition easily reversible. It marks a deeper change in attitude. If it continues to affect lending behaviour to southern countries, it will harm their solvency and economic recovery.

It is in this light that we must consider the proposed crisis responses which have emerged and are being discussed. The key question is not one of reform of surveillance nor of boosting the European financial facility. These two decisions, which are now in the pipeline, are welcome, but they do not go to the heart of the problem. The key issue is the set of principles which will underpin the construction of a more robust monetary union.

The main cause of the creeping fragmentation which is observable is the mutual dependence of banks and governments. In the Eurozone banks are vulnerable to sovereign debt because they hold a lot of public paper, frequently issued by their country of origin, and the governments are vulnerable to bank crises because they are individually responsible for rescuing national financial institutions. Every episode in the crisis illustrates how much this interdependence is a source of fragility.

There are three possible responses to this state of affairs. The first relies on intervention by the central bank in case of a threat to the sovereign debt market. The UK's budget situation is worse than that of Spain, but the certainty that the Bank of England would prevent speculation on the UK's debt is sufficient to reassure investors. In the Eurozone the ECB has not been equipped with this mandate. It has played this role with Italy and Spain but is up against stiff opposition, and it may well not continue for much longer. The EFSF may play a similar role but its war-chest is limited. As for changing the powers of the ECB, this would not be acceptable for Germany, if only for constitutional reasons.

The second response consists of strengthening the banks through recapitalisation and removing the dividing walls between national banking systems in order to staunch their overexposure to sovereign default. The Eurozone would be healthier with a properly capitalised banking system, holding diversified assets and endowed with common surveillance and deposit insurance. However, it is to be feared that European leaders may not be bold enough to fully embrace such a plan as they are reluctant to renounce their national champions and access to captive investors. We will soon see how the land lies here when the recapitalisation details become known.

The third response consists of reducing sovereign risk by means of a system of surveillance and mutual guarantees between the Eurozone countries. This is budgetary union, and the fuller form of this is the issue of eurobonds, coupled with ex ante control of the issue of public debt. This is a politically very tough choice both for those countries who would be guarantors and those who would be 'in their charge'. But it probably remains the most practical way forward of the three.

These three responses are in part complementary. Even espousing one of them would be a positive sign. The worst thing would clearly be to do little and merely hope for better days. This may not happen, but it cannot alas be ruled out altogether.

18. PRILOGA 3

The EU budget in an era of austerity: setting the example or compensating for national spending cuts?

EPC / Brussels

When presenting the proposal for the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), José Manuel Barroso stressed that the message coming from many European capitals had been understood: in the current climate of austerity of national public finances, there is no scope for (significantly) increasing the resources available to the EU and the only option is to make choices among chapters of expenditure, ensuring the money available is spent in the best way possible.

But at the same time he defined the 'Budget for Europe 2020' 5 as 'ambitious' and 'innovative', able to take up the policy challenges that the European Union will be facing in coming years, not least by ensuring investment in areas important for future growth (which have been slashed at national level) are protected and facilitated at EU level. Unsurprisingly, the proposals raised strong objections, not least focusing on what increase for EU spending (whether within the MFF or outside) is implied by the

proposals. But the fundamental question goes deeper: to what extent will the new multiannual budget (2014-2020) be able to close the ever-growing gap between EU's political ambitions and its financial means (and instruments). Moreover, the current difficult economic context poses the more general issue of what role should – and can – be played by the EU budget in the recovery of European economies: should the Union set an example by cutting expenditures or should it give itself the financial means to fulfil its high political and economic ambitions? Whether and how this 'trade-off' has been addressed by the European Commission's proposal is the main focus of this paper.

To answer this question, the first step requires some demystification on two different levels: first-of-all, a discussion on the future EU budget cannot avoid being framed in the current 'State of the Union' and the likely development of MFF negotiations to determine whether there might indeed be a mismatch between what the EU budget should be, i.e. what it should deliver and how, and what role the Member States and therefore the next negotiations will assign to it.

Second, it is necessary to analyse the potential for synergy and additionality, and the different nature and function of the European budget when compared to national ones need to be outlined. Using this analysis makes it possible to determine what role the long-term EU budget should have and to what extent the European Commission proposals address the European challenges that need to be tackled.

The context of next MFF negotiations : the risk of budget stalemate

The starting point for an analysis of the role of the future EU budget must be a realistic assessment of the potential progress of the negotiations on the 2014-2020 MFF. Several elements suggest that there is a high risk of budget stalemate in the European Union. From the painful negotiations of the previous MFF 2007-2013 to the difficulties of the approval of the 2011 annual budget, Member States' reluctance and fatigue are palpable. While there have been many reform proposals from experts and stakeholders concerning the next Multiannual Financial Framework, the general feeling is that governments have no willingness to go beyond small incremental changes in the structure of the EU budget and in the overall amounts allocated.

It is within this context that in October 2010 the European Commission published the 'EU Budget Review', fulfilling its mandate to "undertake a full, wide-ranging review covering all aspects of EU spending, including the Common Agricultural Policy, and of resources, including the United Kingdom rebate, and to report in 2008/2009." The Budget Review did, however, not really put into question the traditional policy priorities of European spending, such as the Common Agricultural Policy or Cohesion Policy. Rather, the review tried to identify (new) rationales for EU spending, focusing on the added value of existing spending instruments. Indeed, while some proposals for change and improvement are put forward in the document, the European Commission has been cautious, not suggesting any major overhaul of the budget.

In this respect, the Commission has accepted the status quo logic which has dominated in the past months and years. While the structure of the budget has witnessed some modifications over the years, national positions have remained virtually identical since the beginning. Inertia has characterised previous MFFs, while at the same time the policy challenges (and competences) of the European Union have been evolving. As a result, the EU budget is suffering from a significant mismatch between its means and the objectives the EU is tasked to pursue, both in terms of absolute and relative amounts of resources allocated to each chapter of expenditure.

The inertia in the development of the EU budget has been exacerbated by the current economic crisis, which has highlighted and reinforced the very poor state national finances are in. At the same time, the European Commission has been given an increased role as public finance 'watchdog' with the introduction of the European Semester, the proposals for a renewed Stability and Growth Pact and the Euro+ Pact. Member States have accepted a stricter commitment to public finance consolidation, and most are now struggling to square this with the need for future investment to generate growth. In this context, 'Union bashing' has become a common discourse in European capitals. The result for the budget negotiations is that a number of heads of government have stipulated that the future multi-annual EU budget must also respect the climate of austerity.

More generally, within the European Union there is currently a high level of mistrust, between Member States themselves and between Member States and the European institutions. This is especially the case in relation to economic governance, and the Greek/Euro crisis: net payers such as Germany

have suffered from a significant fatigue, at citizen and policy-maker level, concerning their image as European 'paymasters'. This difficult situation has been accompanied by, or has even exacerbated, the rise of nationalism, parochialism and euro-sceptic attitudes in many Member States. When thinking about the future common EU budget, this mainly translates into the logic of *Juste Retour*, which was already very strong during past MFF negotiations. When sitting at the negotiation table this time, it is likely that governments will think even more about the possible national return of each euro spent at the EU level.

Against this background, one can easily expect that the time from now to the end of 2012, when Member States are supposed to find an agreement on the next MFF, will be characterised by very difficult negotiations, aimed at cutting wherever possible and reducing the room for any change or reform. Taking the status quo scenario as a starting point reduces the ability to make significant progress towards a policy-driven budget: rather than asking what needs to be done at the EU level, it reduces the question to how to make the most out of a given pot of EU money.

National and EU budgets: different means for different functions

"The EU budget is small (1.01% of EU gross national income) because it does not need to mirror national budgets. [...] It is an investment budget – 94.3% is spent in the Member States" A second important demystification concerns the respective roles of the EU and of national budgets. Discussing the possibility of the EU budget as 'compensating' for national spending cuts reflects a narrow interpretation of the actual function of the European budget. The EU budget is very different from national ones: as noted by the European Commission in the quotation above, the European budget 'does not need to mirror national budgets'; this goes both for the type of expenditures and for the relative amount of resources allocated.

With regard to the types of expenditures, there are two elements worth noticing. Firstly, the EU budget fulfils a redistributive function between Member States (or more accurately mostly between Europe's regions) which is not and cannot be fulfilled by national budgets. As practical application of the principle of solidarity underpinning European integration, Cohesion Policy redistributes resources to the poorest regions of Europe. While this redistributive function might not be as significant as it should be, given the small size of the budget, never-theless it has been an effective tool for re-allocating between regions and countries of the EU, not least for the New Member States where these funds are a very significant part of public investment budgets.

Secondly, the EU budget aims to create synergies with national budgets, and therefore concentrate on those goods which cannot be produced in an effective manner at national level. EU funding is meant to address market failures at the European level, and to deliver European public goods. This is where the notion of added value of EU spending has its *raison d'être*. Simply put, in these areas there is an added value of spending at the EU level if a euro spent at the EU level is more effective (or creates more return) than if it were spent at national level. The challenge here is to define what constitutes a European public good. Economically, we define a public good as a non-excludable and non-rival good; in a national context, the government would produce such a good, as the market has no interest in producing a good from which nobody can be excluded and where use by one person does not impede the use by someone else. But 'pure' public goods are hard to find at the national or European level. In this respect, the EU public good argument is more often related to European market failures. At European level, there are market failures produced, for instance, by cross-border consideration (e.g. pollution, research and innovation), or by economies of scale that cannot be exploited at national level.

In contrast to national budgets, the EU budget does not need to spend on all traditional policy areas of a national government, given the functions and competences the EU is tasked to fulfil. In any case, its size will never allow a true compensation of Member States' budget cuts. In a context where increasing the overall amount of the budget is not an option, the only viable solution becomes to select European public goods where returns are maximised, or where a specific problem cannot be addressed at national level but is effectively solved by EU spending. As a consequence, a clear discussion is needed about where cuts might be necessary and where, instead, increasing expenditure can enhance added value of EU spending. Unfortunately, as also reflected in the Commission proposal on the next MFF, such open debate about policy priorities does not really take place, and the budget remains 'locked-in', determined by vested interests or general inertia.

The Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020: neither setting the example, nor compensating for national spending cuts

Whether we take a more 'optimistic' or a rather realistic perspective on the next Multiannual Financial Framework negotiations, it is argued here that the future EU budget will and should neither set an example, nor compensate for national spending cuts. The proposals put forward last week by the European Commission further reinforce this conclusion, given their cautious nature (e.g. in terms of overall increase) coupled with elements of innovation and of a stronger focus on those public goods which cannot be provided by Member States.

The proposal of the European Commission: a budget for Europe 2020

Since the publication of the EU Budget Review in October 2010, two issues have gained importance in the debate: better spending and the use of new financial instruments.¹⁰ They correspond to two major issues the EU budget has been forced to face in the context of the current crisis: namely the need to increase added value of spending (better spending) and the need to leverage private capital to respond to pan-European investment needs (use of new financial instruments). Analysing the proposal of the Commission with these two variables in mind can be illuminating in terms of the proposed role attributed to the budget.

The call for 'better spending' has been translated in the MFF proposal by a greater focus on those projects that have demonstrated the added value of European action in the past, and those actions that respond to the objectives of Europe 2020. The Budget for Europe 2020 has thus been presented as respecting the principles outlined in the Budget Review:

- _ focus on delivering key policy priorities;
- _ focus on EU added value;
- _ focus on impacts and results;
- _ delivering mutual benefits across the European Union.

The Budget Review, the consultation procedure which had preceded it, and the discussion which has followed, might have had the merit to push the European Commission to re-consider EU rationales for action and be explicit about them. They are finally listed in the MFF proposal:

- Funding of common policies that Member States have agreed should be handled at the EU level.
- Express solidarity between all Member States and regions, to support the development of the weakest regions, which also allows the EU to function as a single economic space.
- Finance interventions to complete the internal market – that not even the most prosperous Member States could finance on their own.
- Ensure synergies and economies of scale by facilitating cooperation and joint solutions to issues that cannot be supplied by the Member States acting alone.
- Respond to persistent and emerging challenges that call for a common, pan-European approach.

By clearly outlining the dimensions along which EU spending should be oriented, the Commission has stressed the pan-European nature of the EU budget, whose objective is to create synergies rather than to compensate. Such synergies can be created by closing gaps in European integration (e.g. the Single Market) or by responding to those market failures that go beyond national frontiers. However, this 'clarifying' approach of the Commission has unfortunately not been translated into a major overhaul of the traditional spending chapters. While there is some reshuffling of funding from one chapter to the other (e.g. future food aid for the most deprived people will now be funded by Heading 1, 'Smart and inclusive growth') to better focus on Europe 2020 policy priorities, the usual approach – consisting of looking separately at each spending policy rather than setting priorities across policy areas – has remained. As already set out in previous papers, reforming the budget can only be effective if a more general discussion is underway with regard to the definition of policy areas for action, not restricted to policy fields decided ex ante.

Against this background, the proposals of the Commission have nevertheless put forward some innovations with regard to the implementation of policies, aimed at enhancing the efficiency of spending. In particular, the 'partnerships contract' foreseen for Cohesion Policy could become an effective means to " set the commitment of partners at national and regional level to utilise the allocated funds to implement the Europe 2020 strategy, a performance framework against which progress on commitments can be assessed." ¹³ In addition, the Commission has committed to further

simplification, in particular through the proposal of reducing the number of programmes, putting different instruments under a single framework, mainstream priorities across policy areas, and taking advantage of externalisation (i.e. use of executive agencies) in order to implement the programmes.

When it comes to the use of new financial instruments, the Commission has decided to go further than the Europe 2020 Project Bonds,¹⁴ a rather small facility aimed at credit enhancement of PPP projects to meet some of Europe's infrastructure investment needs. There is a widespread agreement that the European Union has very significant needs in terms of pan-European infrastructure, whose financing will not be able to come from public investment alone. For this reason, the EU budget aims to fulfil the role of an 'investment budget', which would create leverage to facilitate private investment in pan-European economic infrastructure. The proposed 'Connecting Europe Facility' aims to respond to this new function of the EU budget; not compensating for national cuts but focusing on those market failures of a cross-border nature, which need to be addressed in order to have a well-functioning Single Market.

The Commission proposes to allocate €40 billion to accelerate the development of infrastructure connecting the EU; an additional €10 billion will come from the Cohesion Fund, devoted to infrastructure. The money is supposed to be split among energy (€9.1 billion), transport (€31.6 billion) and ICT (€9.1 billion). It aims to fund pre-identified transport, energy and ICT priority infrastructures of EU-wide interest. The facility will be centrally managed by the Commission with the support of an executive agency and financial intermediaries, and the technical implementation of the projects will be done on the ground by the project promoters.

The Connecting Europe Facility has the potential to both show the added value of European spending and to re-orient at least some part of the EU budget towards long-term, strategic investment, which will further highlight the distinction between EU and national budgets. Previous experiences with new financial instruments, in particular in cooperation with the European Investment Bank, have produced good results and have therefore created additional momentum for the Commission to find further solutions. It, however, remains to be seen what the reaction of Member States and other stakeholders will be with regard to this new facility. In particular, the potential implications on the funding of Cohesion Policy have already provoked some reactions in the European Parliament.

'Better spending' and the use of new financial instruments have shaped the discussion around the EU budget in the past months, and have contributed to a reflection on what European resources can deliver the best results. The proposals set out by the European Commission, with the corollary of a cautious overall threshold (1% of EU GNI in payments), have the potential to deliver on both aspects. However, on the basis of the scenario we have described, two questions remain: will Member States accept a move away from the *Juste Retour* logic, by accepting this renewed focus on pan-European objectives/public goods? And, within the context of the financial crisis, is this budget the means to help European economies out of these troubled times?

How can the EU budget cope with the risks of budget stalemate and the need for austerity?

The proposal of the European Commission needs to challenge the tendency of Member States to see the budget in pure accounting terms. A sensible effort has been made by the European Commission to focus on the added value of EU spending, and to clarify what the role of the EU budget in relation to national budgets could be. However, the stalemate scenario could once again reinforce the mismatch between EU ambitions and its means. The European Union needs to deliver on Europe 2020 and its objectives of smart, inclusive and sustainable growth. Moreover, in the context of acute crisis in countries such as Greece and Portugal, growth is a prerequisite for a sustainable reduction of debt. Conversely, the absence of growth would most likely necessitate support for weaker Member States unable to service their debt. Such growth must be achieved in the long term, because the ever-increasing divergences among Member States' economies need to be reduced: without growth in the poorest regions and in the periphery, the euro-zone is in severe trouble – and the European Union with it. So what contribution can the long-term budget make and what are the other, alternative, means available to the EU?

Exploiting the full potential of EU instruments

With regard to the first question, and taking into account the recent MFF proposals, it appears that there is still a margin to enhance the added value of EU spending. It seems contradictory that the Commission accepts the traditional EU policies as the key policy priorities – especially in relation to

the Common Agricultural Policy – without really putting them under discussion, justifying their existence through the willingness of Member States to have EU spending in these fields. The result of such ex post justification is that another chance has (partially?) been lost to reconsider all elements of EU spending, which could have shown that the best option would not only be to spend better on some items, but also to spend on something else if the rationale is weak on existing spending.

To be fair, the Commission proposals have done at least part of the exercise, orienting spending more towards the provision of EU public goods and enhancement of added value. However, such efforts risk being jeopardised by the attitude of Member States, which at first might claim to focus on the highest added value of each euro spent at EU level, but might easily forget these principles when calculating the direct return on the money put into the common pot. Two other strategic directions towards which the proposals for the next MFF seem to point are worth highlighting.

Firstly, the need to explore different forms of cooperation between the private and public sector, which has been acknowledged by proposing a 'Connecting Europe Facility'. As mentioned, the public is unable to provide the capital investment needed for pan-European infrastructure. The use of this new mechanism is worth promoting through the European Union budget, and would reinforce its feature as an 'investment budget'. Yet, for now, the amount devoted to 'Connecting Europe' is quite limited, the practical 'implementability' of the Facility is not clear and such types of investment might be needed in sectors not covered by the facility.

Secondly, the question of the autonomy of the EU budget needs to be tackled. The European Commission has done so in its proposal, by putting forward a new system of own resources based on a financial transaction tax and a new VAT resource. For the budget to fully achieve its objectives and go past the *Juste Retour* logic, its autonomy must be strengthened. It is very unlikely that Member States will agree to the introduction of a purely 'European tax' (e.g. the proposed financial transaction tax), and it is possible that such a decision would have the contradictory effect of further alienating the citizens. However, there might be scope to explore intermediate solutions to increase the independence of EU resources, such as the option of reversing the revenue of the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanisms (EFSM) so that it goes directly into the common EU pot.

Beyond the EU budget: which paths will reinforce long-term growth?

If the European budget is just one of the means to foster growth in the European region, the EU should use all other possible instruments to reinforce the recovery from the crisis. In this respect, there are two main 'tools' available to the European Union, the first of which is a non-spending instrument: the Single Market. The European Common Market remains one of the main achievements of the Union, and it can be defined as a major 'European public good'. However, its potential is still far from being fully realised, as many barriers still exist that hamper the four freedoms. In addition, more can be done to ready the Single Market for the future knowledge economy. It is in this context that the Single Market Act was presented in April as another way to boost growth and jobs in the EU, and a way out of the crisis. In such a difficult economic context, a completed Single Market has become a condition *sine qua non* to increase confidence and offer a more stable investment framework to economic actors. A functioning market will help the European Union to get back on the track of economic growth and social progress, without having to resort to new spending policies.

A second instrument is related to the potential of the EU to stimulate and support productive investment. A 'new deal' based on investment is needed, consisting of a range of different components. Firstly, economically weaker countries need to be supported in creating the conditions to enable productive investment, such as a simplification of administrative procedures and labour-market reform. Secondly, productive investment, such in human capital (e.g. education), should receive a separate treatment in the assessment of public debt to strike a balance between the imperative of fiscal consolidation and the need to invest in order to enhance their future competitiveness. Thirdly, the establishment of a dedicated investment fund – a new Stability and Growth Fund (SGF) aiming specifically to deliver the goals of Europe's growth strategy, Europe 2020, in countries unable to make the necessary investments themselves. Funds from the SGF would not be a bail-out but loan-based investment. Finally, an increased use of new loan/ private-public partnership instruments, including project bonds, to increase leverage.

This would require some funding from the SGF, the European Investment Bank or the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Further economic integration, a reinvigorated Single Market,

reduced divergence and growth in the periphery using surplus savings from the centre would increase Europe's economic dynamism. While this would require some funding from the European budget, the Connecting Europe Facility and wider Cohesion Funding could be the starting point for the establishment of such an investment programme. Discussing the potential of next MFF: much ado about nothing?

The present paper argues that the current difficult economic and political context will only allow for cosmetic changes to the structure and main features of the next Multiannual Financial Framework. With its proposal, the European Commission has tried to strike a balance between respect for austerity and the investments needed, making an effort to focus on the added value of EU money rather than 'compensating' for national cuts. However, the main chapter of expenditures has not been modified, and it is still not clear how the 'innovations' - e.g. the Connecting Europe Facility - will work. By balancing out the different expectations and requests, coming from Member States, institutions and other vested interests, the proposal on the next MFF does not seem courageous enough to serve the cause it should, namely ensuring the long-term growth promised by Europe 2020.

The European Union has certainly a role to play in boosting long-term growth and creating the conditions for it. However, the budget might not be the best tool to exploit, especially because it is very difficult to break the logic of *Juste Retour*, at least for now. Against this backdrop, releasing the full potential of the Single Market, by removing existing barriers and readying it for the future knowledge economy, and focusing on a new deal based on increased investment and support for structural reforms, are two concrete options which could put the EU back on the track of long-term economic and social growth, without requiring a complete reorientation of the next MFF.

19. PRILOGA 4

Europe's new credit crunch

EU Observer / Brussels

As the Euro Area (EA) dithers about bailing out Greece in the short term and continues to argue about how to expand the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the sovereign debt crisis is turning into a full-blown banking crisis. Shares in Dexia, the Franco-Belgian banking group, are down 72% on their 52-week high—closely followed by other pillars of western finance such as Bank of America (-66%), RBS (-57%) and Deutsche Bank (-50%). In effect, financial markets have seen the wiring on the wall and have been pulling out of bank shares—both banks that hold euro sovereign debt assets and those that hold shares in other banks that do. This means that the asset side of banks' balance sheets are contracting and that insolvency looms.

True, the gloom lightened briefly when both Angela Merkel and EU President J-M Barroso announced they favoured a pan-European recapitalisation programme—causing EU bank shares to rally for a time. Governments are trying to pour cash into the banks—in the UK, Mervin King has announced an extra £75bn of quantitative easing (QE), allegedly to help industry get more and cheaper credit, but in reality to ward off a new credit crunch along the lines of what happened after Lehman's collapsed in 2008. In his words, we face the 'worst financial crisis ever'.

However, the recapitalisation of Europe's banks faces a serious credibility gap. First, Dexia was one of the banks to pass the European Banking Authority's (EBA) 'stress tests' with flying colours. Secondly, one result of these tests was a serious underestimation of the degree of recapitalisation required. In consequence, a new round of tests will be required adding further to delays. Perhaps more importantly, there is growing pressure from investors to make banks 'mark to market'; ie, report the current market value of their assets. Adoption of such a rule combined with current market volatility would doubtless lead to a large number of banks failing the stress tests.

And of course, the prospect of a Greek default looms larger by the day. The problem is not so much that a Greek default is unaffordable; doubtless, were the country to default on its own, it would take some banks down—starting with its own banks. The real danger is that of contagion. We know that Spain and Italy are 'too big to fail', and the markets have already begun to mark down commercial banks with exposure to them, not just in Spain and Italy but in France and even the UK. Whatever one

may think about financial markets, their analysts are not fools; what they are telling us is that a Greek default will trigger widespread contagion.

Meanwhile, EA Parliaments dither about just how the EFSF's limited capital can be stretched to meet the bill. Since the €440bn available cannot be miraculously turned into the €2tn required for 'shock and awe' to be sure of succeeding, the latest twist involves turning the EFSF from a lending institution into an insurance company, in effect selling credit default swaps (CDSs) to those most in need of insurance. These would be structured into equity, mezzanine and senior layers just like their Wall Street cousins, thus enabling €440bn to be hugely leveraged.

But as more than one commentator has pointed out, there are several problems here. First, one is using over-leveraged instruments to deal with the problem of over-leverage. Second, there is no 'lender of the last resort'—if the scheme goes wrong, governments cannot bailout the losers since it is governments who hold the equity tranches. In principle, the ECB could perform this role—but the Germans are resolute in their opposition to the ECB acting as a Central Bank for governments. [2] For that matter, tiny Slovakia is threatening to upset the EFSF applecart unless collateral is provided for its pledged assistance.

An obvious way out of this nightmare would be to forgive Greece at least half its debt (which the markets believe is in any case unpayable) while further reducing the interest on its loan, lengthening its debt maturity profile and aiding the country to become more competitive. Cynics might say this has been obvious from the start, and that it is now too late. If a European financial crisis does not happen next week, it will occur as part of a disorderly default in December when the pain finally becomes too much for Greeks to bear. It is then that we shall all feel the pain of a full-blown financial crisis, most probably followed by more years of economic recession.

20. PRILOGA 5

Deepening the EU or time for a re-boot?

Friends of Europe / Brussels

Europe's sovereign debt crisis has revitalised the debate about deepening the EU. In the past eighteen months, a new political narrative has been written which led to the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), opened a big debate on the need for "Eurobonds", and stimulated ideas for a real fiscal union to prevent the current fragmented and inefficient approaches to resolving the Eurocrisis.

About ten days ago, these developments went into overdrive with a clear plea from German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble for a new Treaty change in order to establish a full fiscal union, and a remarkable intervention by former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, demanding no less than a "United States of Europe".

Schröder made his call in the context of an event organised by a new European think tank called the "Council for the Future of Europe". This new player on the Brussels scene was created by Swedish billionaire Nicolas Berggruen and seems to have the support of other famous "Europeans", such as former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González and former European Commission President Jacques Delors. One can ask the question: what is going on here? Is European integration on the verge of having another one of those historic moments in which it is able to convert a crisis into a new phase of European cooperation? Have European leaders finally woken up?

I think we need to be a bit sceptical in this case. What we are experiencing with these appeals for more Europe is no more and no less than a drive for more of the same Europe. Political and economic elites are trying to save a model of Europe which they created after 1992 and which is based on the deregulated casino capitalism where "the market" should be given as much freedom as possible to create wealth for the few, which can later be "shared" with the many. It is a Europe for the power and wealth elites, not for European citizens. It might have worked when the economic pie was still growing; it does not work now that this pie has started to shrink as a result of geopolitical power shifts and increasing resource constraints.

Yes, we need more Europe, but first and foremost we need another sort of Europe which puts People and Planet first – a Europe which has social equality, jobs and redistribution, as well as ecological sustainability and climate and energy security as its key priorities. If Europe wants to win back its citizens, nothing less will do. Europe needs a new vision and most likely new leaders and new institutions. Deepening the EU's economic governance alone will not be sufficient. Europe might have to re-boot and find new Founding Fathers.